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On the Use of Client-Specific Information for Face
Presentation Attack Detection Based on Anomaly
Detection
Shervin Rahimzadeh Arashloo and Josef Kittler,
Abstract—The one-class anomaly detection approach has pre-
viously been found to be effective in face presentation attack
detection, especially in an unseen attack scenario, where the
system is exposed to novel types of attacks. This work follows the
same anomaly-based formulation of the problem and analyses the
merits of deploying client-specific information for face spoofing
detection. We propose training one-class client-specific classi-
fiers (both generative and discriminative) using representations
obtained from pre-trained deep convolutional neural networks.
Next, based on subject-specific score distributions, a distinct
threshold is set for each client, which is then used for decision
making regarding a test query. Through extensive experiments
using different one-class systems, it is shown that the use of client-
specific information in a one-class anomaly detection formulation
(both in model construction as well as decision threshold tuning)
improves the performance significantly. In addition, it is demon-
strated that the same set of deep convolutional features used
for the recognition purposes is effective for face presentation
attack detection in the class-specific one-class anomaly detection
paradigm.
Index Terms—Face anti-spoofing, Anomaly detection, One-
class classification, Client-specific information, Deep convolu-
tional representations.
I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH biometrics systems have witnessed an in-crease in their popularity in the past decades, their
reliability is seriously challenged by spoofing attacks where an
unauthorised subject tries to access the system by presenting
fake biometric data. In the case of face recognition systems,
spoofing attacks generally appear as print attacks or replay
attacks.
During the past couple of years, a variety of different face
presentation attack detection (PAD) approaches have been
proposed, achieving impressive performance on benchmarking
data sets. The progress made mainly owes to two factors: i)
the design and deployment of more effective representations
which can better capture the differences between real and
fake biometrics traits, and ii) using more powerful two-class
classifiers. The majority of the approaches to face spoofing
detection proposed in the literature formulate the problem
as a two-class classification problem and then try to learn a
suitable classifier to discriminate between the real accesses
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and spoofing attempts. Despite the huge advances made in
this direction, currently the face PAD methods do not perform
robustly and lack the ability to generalise to more realistic
application scenarios, where the type of presentation attack
cannot be anticipated, and may take a completely new form.
The drawbacks of the common two-class formulation include
[1]:
• Difficulties in learning an effective decision boundary for
classification due to the multi-modal nature of spoofing
attack data;
• Difficulties in augmenting the training set, as attack data
is quite complicated and laborious to collect and, at
the same time, it cannot cover all possible unforeseen
attacks. While it is possible to enlarge the size of real
access data, increasing solely this category of training
data would result in a progressively deteriorating training
set imbalance.
• Lack of generalisation capabilities of the learned two-
class systems to accommodate novel attack types.
Different approaches have been proposed in the literature to
counteract one or more of these shortcomings with various de-
grees of success. Among others, in order to partly compensate
for some of the aforementioned inadequacies, the work in [1]
formulated the face PAD problem as one of anomaly detection,
where the real access data was considered as normal and the
spoofing attacks were presumed to be anomalous observations
deviating from normality. Such a one-class formulation offers
a number of desirable properties such as:
• Insulation from the undesirable effects of the spoofing
data diversity on the performance, as only normal data is
used to build the model;
• Since only real-access data is required for training, the
training set can more easily be extended;
• Anomaly-based methods are better equipped to detect
previously unseen, completely novel attack samples.
In order to measure the capacity of one-class systems to
detect novel forms of attack, previously unseen by the system,
extensive evaluations on different datasets in an innovative
attack evaluation scenario (where the systems were exposed
to novel unseen attack types) were conducted in [1]. It was
observed that the one-class approaches may perform as well
as their two-class counterparts. In a later study, the work in
[2] followed a similar one-class anomaly detection approach
for face PAD using a Gaussian mixture model-based anomaly
detector, which exhibited good generalisation properties on
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novel types of attacks on an aggregated database. Motivated
by these observations and the desirable properties of the one-
class formulation, the current study follows the same one-
class anomaly-based approach with distinctive contributions
outlined in the next subsection.
A. Contributions
An aspect of classifier design which has been unexplored
in [1], [2] is the use of client-specific information. Although
in any spoofing detection system the representations used are
selected in a way that they capture the intrinsic differences
between real accesses and spoofing attempts, such an approach
does not rule out the possibility that the features used can
be affected by the specific characteristics of each individual
client [3]. From this perspective, the majority of the work on
face spoofing detection, including [1], [2], can be considered
as client-independent approaches. A client-independent face
PAD approach assumes that the relevant information comes
from either a real access or the attack class, whereas a client-
specific method assumes that the constructed representations
are additionally influenced by the identities of the subjects.
In [3], it is shown that the client identity information can be
deployed to devise two-class classifiers which can make better
discrimination between the real accesses and spoofing attacks.
The use of identity information in a PAD system is justifiable
from the point of view that anti-spoofing mechanisms are
designed to guard biometrics systems against spoofing attacks
and hence work in conjunction with them. As a result, any
identity information available to a recognition system is readily
accessible by the spoofing detection module. Other work in
[4], [5] have also made use of client identity information
to design client-specific two-class countermeasures to face
spoofing attacks.
Motivated by the aforementioned observations, it is first
shown in this work that the anomaly-based approaches to face
spoofing detection can benefit from client identity information
to improve performance. Although the use of client specific
information in face recognition has been studied extensively
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], the deployment of such informa-
tion for face spoofing detection in the two-class formulation
framework has been limited to just a few studies [3], [4], [5].
This work advocates the use of such information in a one-
class anomaly-detection paradigm and builds effective one-
class face PAD mechanisms. The identity information for
face PAD is deployed in two stages: (i) instead of a single
classifier applicable to all subjects, a separate client-specific
one-class classifier is designed for each individual enrolled
in the dataset; (ii) using score distributions of each user,
subject-specific decision thresholds are determined to make
the final decision. It is shown that the use of client-specific
information, both in the model construction and in setting a
decision threshold, improves the detection performance of one-
class spoofing detection systems by a large margin.
Second, inspired by the recent success of deep neural
networks and in particular deep convolutional neural networks
(CNNs), the proposed one-class approaches are fed with
representations obtained from deep pre-trained CNN models.
The models employed are either pre-trained for the general
object classification purposes or specifically tuned for face
recognition. In this respect, a further contribution of the current
study is a comparative evaluation of the applicability of dif-
ferent deep CNN models designed for recognition purposes to
the problem of face spoofing detection based on the one-class
face PAD formulation. This aspect of the study is particularly
important, as the use of similar features for both recognition
and spoofing detection engines leads to a very interesting
conclusion of practical significance, namely, that the features
used for spoofing detection and recognition can be shared.
This can simplify the design of face biometric systems.
A comparison between different well-known deep CNNs A
comparison between different one-class classifiers A classifier
fusion approach
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section
II, we review the relevant literature. Section III, introduces
the proposed class-specific anomaly detection framework for
face spoofing detection. This discussion is then followed by
a description of different generative as well as discriminative
one-class classifiers and of the deep CNN models examined.
In Section IV, the results of an experimental evaluation of the
proposed class-specific anomaly detection approach are pro-
vided and compared with client-independent methods. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Face spoofing countermeasures can broadly be classified
into hardware-based and software-based methods [12]. While
software-based methods process the data collected from a
typical authentication sensor, hardware-based methods use
additional hardware for anti-spoofing. The hardware-based
solutions typically rely on liveness measurements (e.g. em-
ploying a specific sensor to detect attributes of living bodies),
attack specific detection methods (such as depth measurements
against photo and video attacks) or challenge-response mech-
anisms (requiring the user to respond to random requests).
Software-based methods on the other hand use different at-
tributes of an image sequence along with different classifiers
to detect presentation attacks. Different descriptors used for
this purpose include texture, motion, frequency, colour, shape
or reflectance, while the two-class classifiers employed include
discriminant, regression, distance metric or other heuristic
methods.
Among the cues conveyed by an image/image sequence,
texture is probably the one most frequently used for spoofing
attack detection [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. The use
of texture is based on the assumption that face presentation
attacks produce certain texture patterns which do not exist
in real access attempt data. Motion-based methods constitute
another group where typically two different ways of exploiting
motion are considered. The first approach focuses on intra-face
variations, such as facial expressions, eye blinking, and head
rotation [19], [20], [21], [22], while the other alternative is to
assess the consistency of the user with the environment [13],
[23], [24]. A different category of methods is constituted by
frequency-based countermeasures proposed to detect certain
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image artefacts in 1D or 2D Fourier transform from either
a single image [25] or an image sequence [26], [27], [24].
Despite the fact that colour does not remain constant due to
inconsistencies in imaging conditions, certain colour attributes
have also been used to discern attacks from real accesses in a
different group of methods [15], [28], [29]. Another category
uses shape as a source of information to deal with some
presentation attacks [30]. There also exist methods [31], [32],
[33] which use reflectance information for attack detection,
based on the assumption that real and attack attempts behave
differently under the same illumination conditions.
Along with the use of different cues for attack detection,
a variety of two-class classifiers have also been examined
for face PAD. Discriminant classifiers constitute one such
group of methods where Support Vector Machines are the
most commonly employed technique [34], [13], [35], [36],
[37], [32], [30], [38]. Other works have also examined the
linear discriminant analysis for attack detection [39], [28],
[40]. Other types of classifiers using discriminant procedures
include neural networks [22], convolutional neural networks
[41], Bayesian networks [42] as well as Adaboost [43]. An-
other group includes the regression-based methods which try
to map the input descriptors directly onto their class labels
[13], [23], [44], [26], [4]. There also exist methods based
on learning a distance metric with the goal of measuring
dissimilarities among samples [45], [42], [46]. In addition to
the methods mentioned above, different heuristics have also
been used for classification in face PAD systems [19], [20],
[21], [47].
The majority of the work on face spoofing detection
assumes that the relevant information for the detection of
an attack is independent of the class identity of the data.
Accordingly, the systems are typically designed in a client-
independent fashion. However, it has been observed that the
representations used for the detection of spoofing attempts
are invariably affected by client-specific attributes [3]. Draw-
ing on this observation, the work in [3] studies how much
client-specific information is contained within features and its
effect on the performance of different systems. Using such
information, two client-specific anti-spoofing solutions, one
generative and the other discriminative are built. The methods
proposed outperformed the client-independent methods by a
large margin while demonstrating better generalisation capa-
bilities to unseen types of attacks. Other work [4] proposed
a person-specific anti-spoofing approach using a classifier
specifically trained for each subject in an attempt to dismiss the
interferences among the subjects. A subject domain adaptation
method was then applied to synthesise virtual features, making
it possible to train individual face anti-spoofing classifiers. In
a different study [5], the face PAD problem is addressed by
modelling radiometric distortions involved in the recapturing
process. Having access to the enrolment data of each client,
the exposure transformation between a test sample and its
enrolment counterpart is estimated. A compact parametric
representation is then proposed to model the radiometric
transform and employed as features for classification.
Although the use of client-specific information in two-class
models has led to some improvements, as noted earlier, a
common drawback of these two-class approaches is their insuf-
ficient capacity to generalise to spoofing attempts of different
nature. The detection of novel attack types is particularly chal-
lenging, making it impossible to predict the performance of an
anti-spoofing technique in real-world scenarios. On the other
hand, as it is impossible to foresee all possible attack types and
cover them in the database, one-class approaches, modelling
only the real-access data present a promising direction towards
detection of unseen attack types [48].
III. ANOMALY DETECTION
A. Background
Anomalies are typically known as set of patterns/conditions
which are different in some way from the majority of observa-
tions considered as normal. In this respect, anomaly detection
is a problem of identifying items, events or observations
which do not conform to an expected behaviour or condition.
Anomaly detection finds use in a wide variety of applications
such as fault detection in safety critical systems, intrusion
detection, fraud detection, insurance, health care, surveillance,
etc. Anomalies are referred to in the literature with different
terminology, including outliers, exceptions, peculiarities, sur-
prises, outliers, novelties, noise, deviations, exceptions, discor-
dant observations, peculiarities, aberrations, contaminants, etc.
Among these, anomalies and outliers are the two terms which
are the most commonly used interchangeably.
The common notion of anomaly as an outlier from some
known class representing normality is referred to as point
anomaly in the literature. A general categorisation of anomaly
detection methods applicable to point anomaly detection meth-
ods considers them to be of either generative or non-generative
type [49]. While for generative methods there exist a model for
generating all observations, non-generative approaches lack a
transparent link to the data. The non-generative methods are
best represented by discriminative approaches which try to
identify the class identity of an observation by partitioning
the feature space. The construction of an anomaly detection
mechanism can be based on normal data or on both normal
and anomalous observations. The merits of using only normal
data has been studied in [50]. In this work, both generative
and discriminative approaches are examined for face spoofing
detection in the context of the one-class anomaly detection
framework, where only normal (real-access) data is used for
training.
B. Class-Specific Anomaly Detection
Previous studies formulating face spoofing detection as an
anomaly detection problem [1], [2] considered real-access data
as the normal observations and spoofing attacks as anomalies.
The examination of different one-class classifiers revealed
the merits of such an approach, particularly in the case of
an unseen attack evaluation scheme. In spite of such an
appealing characteristic, the one-class approaches in [1], [2]
implicitly make the assumption that the useful information
conveyed by the chosen representations for categorisation of
a pattern was independent of the client identity. In the case
of the two-class formulation of the face PAD problem, this
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assumption has been re-evaluated in different studies [3], [4],
[5], with the conclusion that, using client-specific information
by virtue of training different client-specific face spoofing
detection classifiers led to significant improvements in the
system performance.
This work advocates a similar client-specific spoofing detec-
tion mechanism but in an anomaly-based paradigm. In order
to train a class-specific anomaly detection model, the class
labels are required both during the training as well as the
operation phase of the system. As discussed in [3], such
information is readily available to a face spoofing detection
engine as it would work in conjunction with a face recognition
system. More specifically, the enrolment data of each subject
in the recognition system can be employed to built a subject-
specific spoofing detection model. In the operation phase of
the spoofing detection system, the class identity information is
accessible from the face verification or identification engine.
While in the face verification case a test subject claims
an identity, in an identification scenario the test image is
compared against several models stored in the gallery, whose
identities are known. In both cases, the identity of the target
class is known and can be utilised by the spoofing detection
system. In summary, in the current work, during the training
phase of the face spoofing detection system, a separate one-
class anomaly detection classifier is trained for each subject
using the enrolment data of the corresponding client while in
the operation phase, the test sample is matched against the
model of the claimed subject. The construction of a subject-
specific classifier in this work benefits from the client identity
information at two levels. First as noted earlier, only the
enrolment data of the subject under consideration is used to
build a one-class classifier. Second, by analysing the score
distributions of each subject, a subject-specific threshold is
determined for the final decision making process. The one-
class classifiers examined in this work, including both, dis-
criminative as well as generative approaches, are explained
next.
C. One-Class SVM (OCSVM)
The one-class SVM proposed in [51] is known to be an
effective discriminative approach for the problem of one-class
classification aiming at detecting samples which are dissimilar
to the majority of the dataset. The one-class SVM method
in [51] attempts to learn a decision boundary that achieves
the maximum separation between the points and the origin
following a quadratic program formulation. For this purpose,
the method in [51] uses an implicit transformation function
defined by a kernel to map input data into a high dimensional
feature space. It finds a hyperplane which is maximally distant
from the origin, separating the data from the origin. To this
end, a binary function is proposed which returns +1 in regions
containing the data and -1 elsewhere. For a test sample, the
value of the decision function is evaluated to determine which
side of the hyperplane it falls on in the feature space.
D. One-Class SRC (OCSRC)
The sparse representation based classification (SRC) method
[52], [53] is known to be a valuable generative approach for
classification. The SRC method assumes that a test sample
approximately lies in the linear span of training samples
and then represents it as a sparse linear combination of the
training samples. Different algorithms are available to solve
the sparse representation problem. For the L1-minimisation
problem (imposing an L1 cost on the sparse coefficients), rel-
atively efficient methods exist [54], [55]. From a classification
perspective, one can classify the test sample based on the re-
construction error using the sparse coefficients corresponding
to a target class. In a one-class problem, the reconstruction
residual of the normal class is used as a dissimilarity criterion.
E. Mahalanobis Distance (MD)
As a baseline method, in this work it is assumed that the
representations obtained from a real-access sequence follow a
single-mode Gaussian distribution. Despite being a simplistic
assumption, it is found to serve as a good baseline approach.
Once the parameters characterising the normal distribution are
estimated using the real-access (normal) samples, testing for
normality entails computing the Mahalanobis distance of a test
pattern to the mean of the normal class.
F. Deep Representations
Motivated by the recent success of deep networks and in
particular deep convolutional networks (CNNs), in this work
deep pre-trained CNN models are used to derive represen-
tations from an image sequence. The chosen CNN models
include a deep pre-trained model for the general object recog-
nition problem as well as a model specifically tuned for face
recognition purposes. This choice is made to assess the appli-
cability of deep pre-trained CNN models to the face spoofing
detection problem in the proposed client-specific one-class
framework. In particular, as illustrated in the experimental
evaluation section, deep pre-trained models which are specif-
ically tuned for face recognition can be directly employed to
detect spoofing attacks. This has important implications as
it simplifies face biometrics system design by unifying the
feature extraction stages for both recognition and PAD units.
A description of the deep CNN models utilised in this work
is provided next.
1) GoogLeNet: GoogLeNet [56] is a deep convolutional
neural network based on the inception model. GoogLeNet
achieved the state-of-the-art result for classification and de-
tection in the ImageNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition Chal-
lenge 2014 (ILSVRC14) [57]. In this model, following a care-
fully crafted design, the depth and width of the network was
increased compared to the previous networks while keeping
the computational budget constant. GoogLeNet is a 22-layer
deep network, the quality of which is validated in the context
of classification and detection problems.
2) VGGFace: VGGFace [58] is a deep CNN model based
on the VGG model, comprised of 11 blocks, each containing
a linear operator followed by one or more non-linearities
such as ReLU and max pooling. The first eight blocks are
convolutional, while the last three blocks are fully connected.
In this network, the convolution layers are followed by a
rectification layer. The model is trained on a very large scale
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dataset of 2.6M images from over 2.6K subjects. It achieved
competitive results on the LFW [59] and YTF [60] face
benchmarks.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The aim of the experiments described in this section is
to evaluate the performance of different client-specific one-
class face PAD methods and and compare it to the client-
independent one-class approaches in an unseen attack sce-
nario. As noted earlier, an essential pre-requisite to build a
client-specific face anti-spoofing system is the availability of
enrolment data for each client in the database. However, the
majority of face-spoofing data sets currently in use, including
the CASIA FASD [61], MFSD [38] and NUAA [33] lack
enrolment data. Although it is possible to violate the protocols
of these data sets and use parts of real access data as the
enrolment data, in such a case, the dedicated enrolment data
and the test samples would come either from a single session
or even worse from a single video which would make the
data highly correlated and the results strongly biased. In this
study we use the Replay-Attack dataset [14], which is a widely
used benchmark that provides enrolment data for each client,
in addition to the training, development and test sets.
A. The Replay-Attack Data Set
The Replay-Attack database [14] includes video recordings
of real-access and attack attempts of fifty different individ-
uals. For each subject, a number of videos in two different
conditions, controlled and adverse, were recorded using an
Apple MacBook laptop. The same illumination conditions and
background settings were used for real access and presentation
attack video recordings. A 12.1 Megapixel Canon camera and
a 3.1 Megapixel iPhone 3GS camera were used to capture two
high-resolution images of each subject. Attacks were realised
in one of the following scenarios: (1) Print: where hard copies
of the high-resolution digital photographs printed on plain A4
paper are displayed; (2) Mobile: where photos and videos
taken with the iPhone are displayed on the iPhone screen;
and (3) Highdef: where the high resolution digital photos and
videos are displayed using an iPad screen. Each attack video
is captured in two different modes: (1) Hand-held: where the
attack media or device is held by an operator; and (2) Fixed-
support: where the attack device is fixed on a support.
The video recordings in this database are divided randomly
into three subject-disjoint subsets for training, development
and testing purposes. While the test set is solely used to report
error rates and to generate the performance curves, the training
set is designated for model training and the development set
is typically used to set system parameters. In addition to the
training, development and test sets, the Replay-Attack database
provides an extra set of 100 videos recorded in a separate
session that correspond to the enrolment data for each of the
fifty subjects.
The performance of a spoofing detection system is com-
monly reported in terms of Half Total Error Rate (HTER),
which is half of the sum of the False Rejection Rate (FRR),
and the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) on the test set. When
reporting HTER, the decision threshold is set such that FRR
and FAR on the development set are equal. In addition,
the performance can also be presented using the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which plots the True
Positive Rate (TPR) versus the False Positive Rate (FPR) for
different values of the decision threshold. The Area Under the
ROC Curve (AUC) can be used as an indicator of the average
performance of a system irrespective of a specific decision
threshold.
B. Systems Evaluated
Using a combination of the deep CNN’s and the one-
class classifiers introduced earlier, different generative meth-
ods evaluated in this work are as follows:
• OCSRC +GoogLeNetspe:
The client-specific one-class SRC classifier operating on
GoogLeNet representations
• OCSRC +GoogLeNetind:
The client-independent one-class SRC classifier operating
on GoogLeNet representations
• OCSRC + V GGFacespe:
The client-specific one-class SRC classifier operating on
VGGFace representations
• OCSRC + V GGFaceind:
The client-independent one-class SRC classifier operating
on VGGFace representations
• MD +GoogLeNetspe:
The client-specific Mahalanobis distance classifier
operating on GoogLeNet representations
• MD +GoogLeNetind:
The client-independent Mahalanobis distance classifier
operating on GoogLeNet representations
• MD + V GGFacespe:
The client-specific Mahalanobis distance classifier
operating on GoogLeNet representations
• MD + V GGFaceind:
The client-independent Mahalanobis distance classifier
operating on GoogLeNet representations
The discriminative approaches evaluated are as follows:
• OCSVM +GoogLeNetspe:
The client-specific one-class SVM classifier operating
on GoogLeNet representations
• OCSVM +GoogLeNetind:
The client-independent one-class SVM classifier
operating on GoogLeNet representations
• OCSVM + V GGFacespe:
The client-specific one-class SVM classifier operating
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on VGGFace representations
• OCSVM + V GGFaceind:
The client-independent one-class SVM classifier
operating on VGGFace representations
C. Implementation Details
In the following experiments, in order to minimise the
effect of background on the detection performance, only the
face regions are used in each sequence. For this purpose, the
coordinates of the faces provided along with the Replay-Attack
dataset are used to crop out a face from the entire image in
each frame. In the case of a missing bounding box for a frame,
the coordinates of the last detected face in the same sequence
are used instead. Next, the CNN models described earlier are
used as mechanisms for feature extraction. To this end, once
the final fully-connected layers of each model performing the
classification are removed, the models are applied to the facial
regions of each individual frame. This results in feature vectors
of 4096 elements for the VGGFace network and 1024-element
feature vectors for GoogLenet, per each frame.
For the construction of OCSVM models, once the feature
vectors are L2-normalised, MatlabR2017b is used to build the
one-class SVM classifiers using a radial basis function kernel.
The normalization parameter in the kernel is determined
automatically. The Mahalanobis distance is implemented as
a Euclidean distance in the PCA space, the dimensionality of
which is determined by retaining 99% of the variance in the
data. Each feature vector in this case is mapped to a lower
dimensional space using the leading eigenvectors and then
divided by the square root of the corresponding eigenvalues.
For building the OCSRC models, the sparse coefficient are
obtained via the Homotopy-based algorithm of [54], where
deep representations obtained from the enrolment/training
frames are used as dictionary elements. While for the OCSVM
and MD classifiers we use the feature vectors corresponding
to all the enrolment/training frames, in the case of OCSRC,
due to the high computational complexity of the method, the
number of dictionary elements is set to 10% of the total avail-
able samples. An analysis of the effect of the training sample
size on system performance is conducted in the experimental
evaluation section.
The enrolment data available for each client in the data set
is used for training and to build the class-specific models.
In contrast, the real-access training data is used for the
construction of class-independent models. In the evaluation
phase, a query is matched only against the claimed client
model. It should be reiterated that in both, class-specific and
class-independent cases, only the real access data is used to
build a one-class anomaly detection model. As a result, the
evaluation scheme is unseen in the sense that none of the
attack types is seen during the training phase of the system.
The main purpose of the experiments described in this
section is to demonstrate the merits of using client-specific
information in the selected CNN feature space in conjunction
with the anomaly detection paradigm. As such, the construc-
tion of the one-class face spoofing detection mechanisms is not
aimed to compete with the best performing two-class methods
utilising both real access and spoofing data. Instead, the focus
here is on improving the performance of one-class anomaly
based methods which possess the appealing characteristics
listed earlier. Nevertheless, the proposed methods can be
compared to the existing approaches in the literature provided
that the same evaluation scenario (i.e. unseen attack type) is
followed. As a by-product of the experiments, it will be shown
that the deep CNN models examined possess the potential to
be used directly for feature extraction for face presentation
attack detection in a one-class client-specific anomaly detec-
tion framework. The proposed approach is depicted in block
diagram form in Fig. 1.
D. Per-Frame Results
As the employed deep CNN models are applied to each
individual frame, it is possible to report the performance of
different systems on a per-frame basis. The criteria for the
evaluation of various methods are the AUC, EER and HTER
measures. AUC indicates the area under the TPR vs. FPR
curve on the test set while EER denotes the equal error rate
(FNR=FPR) on the development set. HETR is the mean of
FNR and FPR on the test set when the threshold is set to the
EER point on the development set. Table I reports the EER
(on the development set) while Tables II and III report AUC
(on the test set) and HTER (on the test set). In the tables,
”Spe” denotes client-specific models whereas ”Ind” stands for
client-independent methods. As can be seen from the tables,
the proposed client-specific approach boosts the performance
of all one-class anomaly detection methods. The reduction
in HTER on the test set can be as high as ∼ 80% for the
MD classifier. In terms of AUC on the test set, the margin in
the performance improvement can be as high as ∼ 50% for
the OCSRC and MD classifiers. The best performing client-
specific method in this case is the MD classifier operating
on the features extracted via the GoogLeNet model with the
HTER of 7.84% and the AUC measure of 97.55% whereas
the HTER achieved by the client-independent MD method
operating on the same set of deep representations is 38.01%
with the AUC of 65.52%.
E. Per-Video Results
In this section, the performance of the proposed approach
is reported on a per-video basis. For this purpose, a score-
level fusion approach is applied to obtain the final score for
a given video. We opt for the mean fusion rule, averaging
the scores of different frames in a given video to produce
the final score for the video. As in the per-frame case, the
performance of different systems is reported in terms of EER
(on the development set), AUC (on the test set) and HTER
(on the test set) measures. Tables IV, V and VI report the
EERs, AUCs, and HTERs for the same systems on a per-video
basis. A notable improvement in performance is observed in
the per-video evaluation. As can be verified from the tables, all
the client-specific approaches perform better than their client-
independent counterparts. On a per-video basis, the largest
boost in performance in terms of the AUC measure on the
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Fig. 1: The proposed approach for client-specific anomaly-detection based PAD.
TABLE I: EER measures (%) on the development set of the
Replay-Attack dataset on a per-frame basis
TABLE II: AUC measures (%) on the test set of the Replay-
Attack dataset on a per-frame basis.
TABLE III: HTER measures (%) on the test set of the Replay-
Attack dataset on a per-frame basis
test set corresponds to the OCSVM+VGGFace system with a
∼ 53% improvement. The largest reduction in HTER on the
test set again corresponds to the OCSVM+VGGFace system
with a ∼ 78% reduction in error rate. The best performing
method in this case is the MD+GoogLeNet system with
an HTER of 4.62%, whereas the best performing client-
independent method of MD+VGGFace obtains a HTER of
28.63%
F. Discussion
In the experiments conducted so far it is shown that the use
of client identity information can result in large improvements
in system performance for all the three classifiers examined.
Regarding the deep CNN models examined, the outstanding
performance of these networks in the face PAD context
TABLE IV: EER measures (%) on the development set of the
Replay-Attack dataset on a per-video basis.
TABLE V: AUC measures (%) on the test set of the Replay-
Attack dataset on a per-video basis.
TABLE VI: HTER measures (%) on the test set of the Replay-
Attack dataset on a per-video basis.
illustrates the applicability of such models for face PAD in the
one-class client-specific framework. Interestingly, although the
GoogLeNet network is not tuned for face recognition, yet it
performs reasonably well.
G. Class-specific thresholds
In the preceding experiments, a single global threshold, set
on a disjoint set of subjects (the development set), is utilized
for all the clients in the decision making step. However, the
global threshold could possibly be optimal only if the score
distributions corresponding to different subjects were similar.
The score distributions for the 15 subjects in the development
set for different systems are depicted as box plots in Fig. 2,
where the horizontal dotted line in each plot corresponds to the
global threshold used in the global threshold experiments. As
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Fig. 2: Box plots of score distributions of different client-specific systems for the 15 subjects in the development set; From top
to bottom in each row: OCSVM, OCSRC and MD classifiers, respectively; Left column GoogLeNet, right column VGGFace
TABLE VII: The effect of using a client-specific threshold vs. a global threshold on the EERs (%) of the development
set.(G.Thr.: Global Threshold, CS.Thr.: Client-Specific Threshold)
can be seen from the figure, different subjects exhibit different
score distributions. As a result, a single global threshold results
in a suboptimal performance of the proposed systems.
In order to evaluate the efficacy of using client-specific
thresholds, a distinct threshold is set for each subject in
each client-specific system and the error rates obtained are
compared with those obtained by the systems using a global
threshold in Tables VII and VIII on the development and test
sets, respectively. As can be seen from the tables, the use
of subject-specific thresholds improves the performance of all
systems. The best performing method on the test set is the
OCSRC + V GGFace with an ERR of 1.50% in the per-
video evaluation, where the improvement obtained through
the use of subject-specific thresholds reaches ∼ 76%. In
the per-frame evaluation on the test set, the best performing
system is found to be MD + V GGFace with an EER of
5.10%, benefiting from the use of client-specific thresholds
by a ∼ 37% reduction in EER.
H. Geometric Normalisation
In the experiments conducted so far, the face bounding
box coordinates were used to extract a face from the entire
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TABLE VIII: The effect of using a client-specific threshold vs. a global threshold on the EERs (%) of the test set.(G.Thr.:
Global Threshold, CS.Thr.: Client-Specific Threshold)
TABLE IX: The effect of geometric normalisation based on the eyes coordinates in terms of AUCs (%) on the test set.
frame. No further geometric pre-processing was applied on
the image prior to feature extraction. In this section, the effect
of a geometric pre-processing step on the system performance
is analysed. To this end, using the method in [62] facial
landmarks are detected followed by a non-reflective similarity
transformation to set the interocular distance to 40 pixels
where the size of normalised image is 90×90. The rest of the
procedure is kept similar to the previous experiments. Table
IX reports the corresponding AUCs obtained on the test set
on a per-frame and per-video basis and compares these to the
case when only bounding boxes are used. As can be observed
from the table, a geometric normalisation based on the eyes
coordinates moderately improves the system performance for
all the evaluated systems in the per-frame evaluation scheme.
The largest improvement in AUC’s for the per-frame scenario
corresponds to the OCSVM + GoogLeNetspe system with
a ∼ 1.76% gain. For the per-video evaluation scenario, the
largest improvement in performance again corresponds to the
OCSVM +GoogLeNetspe system with a ∼ 1.67% gain. It
is expected that a more effective and accurate eye detection
mechanism other than the method in [62] would result in a
larger improvement in performance.
I. Training Sample Size
In this section, the effect of training sample size on per-
formance is analysed. In this respect, the client-specific one-
class methods operating on the aligned version of the test set
are considered where the training sample size is gradually
increased from 1% of the total samples available to 100%.
More specifically, the fractions of the total number of available
samples used for training the client-specific systems are 1100 ,
1
75 ,
1
50 ,
1
20 ,
1
10 ,
1
5 and
1
1 . Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the
effect of training sample size on the performances of various
systems on a per-frame and per-video basis, respectively. As
can be observed from the figures, for the systems based on
the MD classifier increasing the number of training samples
monotonically improves performance. On the other hand, the
performance of all systems operating on the one-class SRC
basis deteriorates when the training sample size increases from
Fig. 3: The effect of the training sample size on the per-
formance in terms of AUC (%) on the test set.(per-frame
evaluation)
20% to 100% of the total number of available samples. In this
case, while the optimal fraction of the total number of training
samples might differ from one system to another, the 10%
fraction used in our earlier experiments does not seem to be
far from optimal. Regarding the one-class SVM, despite some
fluctuations in performance, increasing the number of training
samples typically improves performance.
J. Comparison to Other Methods in the Unseen Scenario
Despite the fact that there exist different methods to evaluate
the generalisation capacity of PAD systems, only a few have
followed the unseen attack type evaluation protocol. The ma-
jority of the methods which have tried a cross-database evalu-
ation are directed more towards evaluating the generalisation
capabilities of different systems subject to different imaging
conditions (lighting, background, sensor-interoperability, etc.)
rather than attack type. Among other two-class systems, the
work in [5] and [3] have followed the unseen evaluation
scheme on the Replay-Attack dataset. While the evaluation
scheme considered in [5] is unseen in the sense that it
excludes one of the three attack types (Print, Digital Photo
and Video) during training in each of the considered scenarios,
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Fig. 4: The effect of the training sample size on the per-
formance in terms of AUC (%) on the test set.(per-video
evaluation)
the evaluation cannot be considered completely unseen as
the authors use similar attack types (video replays) both
for training and evaluation in some of the their evaluations.
As a result, our comparison is limited to the work in [3],
[63]. As the subjects in the development and test set of the
Replay-Attack dataset are disjoint and setting a client-specific
threshold requires development data for each test subject,
it is impossible to assess the performance of the proposed
client-specific approach using subject-specific thresholds in
terms of the usual HTER measure on the test set. As a
result, the comparison is limited to the EER measures on
the development set. The best EER on the development set
obtained using a discriminative approach in [63] is 2.83%,
whereas the best EER on the development set obtained in this
work is 0.17% (face bounding boxes) obtained for both the
OCSRC + V GGFacespe and MD+ V GGFacespe systems
with client-specific thresholds, in spite of the fact that no attack
data has been used for training.
V. CONCLUSION
A novel approach to face presentation attack detection in
the unseen attack scenario is developed. Motivated by the
promising performance of the one-class anomaly detection
approaches, a client-specific version of the one-class method-
ology is proposed for the detection of face presentation attacks.
Both generative and discriminative one-class classifiers utilis-
ing only positive samples (real access data) for training are
examined. It is shown that the use of client identity information
in the model construction can boost the system performance
of both discriminative and generative approaches significantly.
Based on the score distributions of different clients, subject-
specific thresholds are determined and used further to improve
the performance. Different deep CNN models serving as
mechanisms for feature extraction in face PAD have been
evaluated. It has been shown that the same set of deep CNN
features as that used for face recognition can be employed
for the presentation attack detection in the context of the
proposed client-specific one-class approach. A comparison of
the proposed one-class client-specific approaches to two-class
methods in the unseen attack scenario confirmed the merits of
the proposed approach.
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